The problem of falsity conduciveness
According to Akiba, coherence as I define it is falsity conducive at the level of individual beliefs in the sense that 'the other conditions being equal, the more coherent a set is, the less probable the members of the set are' (357). 1 Akiba finds this 'very counterintuitive' but a moment's reflection reveals that this is exactly the way it should be. When we revise the degree of coherence among beliefs upward, we normally revise the probability of their being all true upward -hence coherence is truth-conducive at the level of sets. However, if for some reason the probability of the beliefs' being all true should remain the same, we must conclude from the higher degree of coherence that the beliefs are individually less likely to be true than previously thought -hence coherence is 'falsity-conducive' at the level of individual beliefs. The situation is no different in the case of ordinary empirical justification. When we obtain some empirical evidence in favour of a hypothesis, we normally revise the probability of the hypothesis upward -hence the evidence is truth conducive with regard to the posterior probability. However, if for some reason the probability of the hypothesis should remain the same despite the empirical support, we must conclude that the prior probability should have been lower than we thought -hence the evidence is 'falsity conducive' with regard to the prior probability. What we have here is a probabilistic variant of the dictum 'One philosopher's modus ponens is another's modus tollens.' Whether it is coherence or empirical evidence, one can use any probabilistic support to argue either that the posterior probability should be higher, or that the prior probability should have been lower.
In order to bolster his case against falsity conduciveness Akiba introduces an example of logical entailments involving the following three beliefs:
B 1 : The die will come up two. B 2 : The die will come up an even number less than six. B 2 ¢: The die will come up an even number.
Akiba assumes here that the coherence of {B 1 , B 2 } should be no different from that of {B 1 , B 2 ¢}, since both B 2 and B 2 ¢ are logical consequences of B 1 (357). But the former degree is higher than the latter according to my definition. This is because coherence in my definition is falsity conducive in the sense that given Prob(B 1 & B 2 ) = Prob(B 1 & B 2 ¢), {B 1 , B 2 } is more coherent than {B 1 , B 2 ¢} if and only if B 2 is less probable than B 2 ¢. I have already explained why coherence should be falsity conducive in this sense. In the present case this means that contrary to Akiba's supposition {B 1 , B 2 } should indeed be more coherent than {B 1 , B 2 ¢}. Akiba is wrong in assuming generally that if A logically entails both B and C, then {A, B} should be as coherent as {A, C}. To see why this is wrong, consider the following three beliefs: 
The problem of self-coherence
Akiba's misunderstanding of the intent of my definition is more evident in his second objection about self-coherence. Akiba notes that my definition makes the degree of coherence of a single belief always one (357) . 3 This means a single belief is neither coherent nor incoherent. Akiba thinks this is a serious flaw, but this is exactly the way it should be in epistemology, where a collection of beliefs is judged coherent when they hang together (are likely to be true together). It makes no sense to say a single belief is coherent or incoherent. Akiba cites beliefs in mathematical and logical truths as examples of self-coherent beliefs, but most epistemologists will call them a priori beliefs.
The problem of conjunction
Akiba's third objection relates to the second but is more substantial. According to my definition, any single belief is neither coherent nor incoherent. This is also true of single conjunctive beliefs. Any single conjunctive belief is neither coherent nor incoherent regardless of its conjuncts. Akiba now argues that for any beliefs B 1 and B 2 the coherence of {B 1 , B 2 } should be no different from the coherence of {B 1 & B 2 }, since a conjunction and its conjuncts are mutually derivable. As a result, my definition makes any pair of beliefs neither coherent nor incoherent, he concludes. This would certainly be 'the collapse of the whole framework ' (358) .
What is missing in Akiba's reasoning is an individuation of beliefs that is appropriate for the evaluation of coherence. It is common -regrettably, even among epistemologists -to individuate beliefs by their contents, but this will not do for the purpose of evaluating coherence. To see why, we revisit the example of fossil dating with new twists: In this new version, two of the measurements yield exactly the same result in A and D. Consequently, the coherence of A and D is even stronger than that of A and B. Note however that A and D are identical by content-based individuation. We distinguish them nonetheless for the purpose of evaluating coherence because they come from different sources. Meanwhile, despite their difference in contents, A and A* should not be considered distinct when it comes to evaluating coherence, because the latter is derived from the former. It is not surprising that we feel no more confident about the dating when we obtain A* from A by inference. If we wish to relate the concept of coherence to epistemic justification, as most epistemologists do, we must individuate beliefs by their sources, and not by their contents.
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Thus we must reject Akiba's general claim that the coherence of beliefs should be no different from the coherence of their conjunction. When beliefs have different sources, we cannot treat them as a single conjunctive belief to claim that they are neither coherent nor incoherent.
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